Course: Public Finance - Graduate
Credits 6
Aims: This course is the advanced version of Undergraduate Public Finance. The course is designed to provide students with a strong foundation in economic analysis of government’s behavior and the opportunity to apply this knowledge in specialized subject areas such as constitutional political economy, regulation, public debt, tax evasion and social security. The course trains students to apply economic methodology of individual choice to an understanding of government and politics.
First teaching day: September 18th, 2017
This course is available in the 1st semester
Class time:
Monday, 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.
Tuesday, 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.
Wednesday, 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.
Place: Lecture Hall 9
Office Hours: Tuesday, 2:00-3:00 p.m.
List of Topics with References:
Fiscal Constitution, Taxation and Public Expenditures
Geoffrey Brennan, Giuseppe Eusepi (2004), “Fiscal Constitutionalism” in Jürgen G. Backhaus, Richard E. Wagner (eds.), Handbook of Public Finance, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Chapter 3.
Fabrizio Balassone, Daniele Franco (2004), “EMU Fiscal Rules: New Answers to Old Questions?” in G. Eusepi, F. Schneider (eds.), Changing Institutions in the European Union. A Public Choice Perspective, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar, Chapter 1.
Normative and Political Analysis of Taxation
Walter Hettich, Stanley Winer (2004), “Rules, Politics and the Normative Analysis of Taxation” in Jürgen G. Backhaus, Richard E. Wagner (eds.), Handbook of Public Finance, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Chapter 5.
Tax Morale vs Tax Evasion
Lars, P. Feld, (2009), “Do We Really Know Much About Tax Non-compliance?” in Geoffrey Brennan, Giuseppe Eusepi (eds.), The Economics of Ethics and the Ethics of Economics. Values, Markets and the State, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, Chapter 9.
Taxation vs. Regulation
Geoffrey Brennan (2004), “The Political Economy of Regulation: A Prolegomenon” in Giuseppe Eusepi, Friedrich Schneider (eds.), Changing Institutions in the European Union. A Public Choice Perspective, Cheltenham U.K., Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, Chapter 4.
Andy H. Barnett, Bruce Yandle (2004), “Regulation by Taxation” in Jürgen G. Backhaus, Richard E. Wagner, (eds.), Handbook of Public Finance, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Chapter 9.
Alternative fiscal institutions and alternative learning processes
Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, (1988) “Fiscal Churning” in G. Brennan, Bhajan S. Grewal and Peter Groenewegen (eds.), Taxation and Fiscal Federalism, Australian National University Press, 1988, pp. 14-28.
J.R. Clark, Dwight R. Lee, “Government Transfers and Inequality: An Anatomy of Political Failure”, in Giuseppe Eusepi (ed.) Welfare in the 21st Century, Symposium, Public Finance and Management, Volume 8, Number 2, 2008.
G. Eusepi, R. E. Wagner, “States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises”, Review of Political Economy, 23:4, 573-585.
G. Eusepi, R.E. Wagner, “Polycentric Polity: Genuine vs. Spurious Federalism”, in G. Brennan, G. Eusepi (Guest Editors), special issue ‘Ex Uno Plures. Welfare Without Illusion’, Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 6 (2010), Issue 3, pp. 329-345.
Public Debt
John Cullis, Philip Jones (1998), Public Finance and Public Choice, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 10, pp.257-271.
Giuseppe Eusepi, Luisa Giuriato, “Democracy, Debt and Disorder. Towards the End of Political Generosity” in Giuseppe Eusepi (ed.) Welfare in the 21st Century, Symposium, Public Finance and Management, Volume 8, Number 2, 2008.
Giuseppe Eusepi, Richard E. Wagner, Public Debt. An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy, Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2017, Chapters 1-2-4-5-6. This book is available in hardback version and electronically from Edward Elgar at http://www.e-elgar.com/shop/public-debt
Handouts, in the form of brief PowerPoint presentations, will be provided after
the lecture. Materials not included in the book Public Debt. An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy will be available from the secretaries at the Department of Law and Economics of Productive Activities. An electronic copy of the material will be available at https://web.uniroma1.it/deap/informazioni-su-giuseppe-eusepi
Learning outcomes:
By the end of the course, students should be able to understand current contributions to public finance, to apply public finance theory to assess the connection between public spending and taxation, to appreciate the dissonance between conventional and non-conventional approach to the welfare state.
Information about the examination:
Assessment is by written examination. The exam will consist of 3 questions to be answered in an hour and a half.
Download
Government Transfers and Inequality: An Anatomy of Political Failure, di Clark, Lee